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Notes and explanation of symbols 
The following symbols have been used in the tables in this Survey: 
Three dots (...) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported. 
A dash ( — ) indicates that the amounts is nil or negligible. 
A blank space in a table means that the item in question is not aplicable. 
A minus sign (-) indicates a deficit or decrease, unless otherwise indicated. 
A full stop (.) is used to indicate decimals. 
A slash (/) indicates a crop year or fiscal year, e.g., 1969/1970. 
Use of a hyphen (-) between years, e.g., 1960-1970, signifies an annual average for the calendar years involved, 
including the beginning and the end years. 
References to "tons" mean metric tons, and to "dollars" United States dollars, unless otherwise stated. 
Unless otherwise stated, references to annual growth rates of variation mean cumulative annual rates. 
Figures and percentages in tables may not neccessarily add up to the corresponding totals, because of rounding. 
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LATIN AMERICA 
One central fact which distinguished the first half of 1988 from other years was the 
considerable rise in the international prices of many primary commodities exported by the 
region. This development was reflected in a somewhat easier external payments situation, 
but even so Latin America and the Caribbean are still suffering, for the second year 
running, from a reduction in their already low growth rate and a resurgence of inflation. 
Thus, it is estimated that in 1988 the region's output will probably increase by only 0.6%, 
which would mean a decline of 1.5% in the per capita output (see table 1). 
The improvement in the international prices of temperate-zone agricultural products 
and, above all, of metals enabled the non-oil-exporting countries of the region to reduce 
their current account deficits significantly. In contrast, the drop in the price of 
hydrocarbons adversely affected the exports of the oil-exporting countries. Furthermore, 
the unfavourable effects of the rise in international interest rates on debt-servicing 
commitments will absorb part of the benefit which the non-oil-exporting countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean are obtaining this year from the recovery in their 
terms of trade; as for the oil-exporting countries these effects come on top of the 
decline in their terms of trade, so that there will be a marked increase in their current 
account deficit (see table 2). 
The fact that the easing of external constraints has been reflected in higher levels 
of economic expansion in only a limited number of countries reflects, inter alia, the 
accumulated effect of adjustment policies and of factors associated with the heavy 
external debt burden. In 1988 the interplay of these factors contributed in particular to 
the worsening of inflationary processes, which in turn sharply restricted growth. Thus, 
either because the rate of inflation speeded up or got completely out of hand in some 
cases and because even more intensive efforts were made to control it, the struggle 
against inflation became the issue of highest priority in most countries and decisively 
influenced the economic results obtained. In many cases, the potential benefits due to the 
greater availability of foreign exchange have been wiped out by the disruptive effects of 
the upsurge in inflation or by the restrictive effects of the stabilization policies applied. 
Indeed, it is only those countries with moderate rates of inflation —Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica and Paraguay-- which avoided this syndrome and succeeded in growing 
significantly in the period under review. 
The difficulty in simultaneously achieving growth, external equilibrium and a 
reasonable degree of price stability is largely a consequence of the burden of the 
external debt and of the enormous transfer of resources to the exterior its servicing 
entails. This transfer has represented a reversal of the order of 6.5% compared with the 
gross domestic product: instead of receiving net resources equivalent to 2.6% of GDP, as 
was usual before the crisis, since 1982 the region has been transferring to the exterior 
resources equivalent to 3.9% of its GDP (see table 4). The consequent shortage of 
foreign exchange has put a lasting brake on growth. 
What the experience of 1988 brings out most clearly in most of the countries, 
however, is the way in which the difficulty in making these transfers and the problems 
involved in trying to cope with high or growing inflation combined to hinder growth. 
Thus, as the bulk of the external debt corresponds to the public sector (either because it 
was this sector which originally contracted the debt or because it subsequently took over 
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responsibility for most private sector debt), the transfer of resources to the exterior also 
usually entails a domestic transfer of resources from the private sector to the public 
sector. Since the transfer typically is out of proportion with the capacity to raise tax 
revenues, much of it has had to be paid for through inflationary financing. This, in turn, 
has contributed to the sharp increase in prices throughout most of the region since the 
outbreak of the debt crisis. 
In 1988 the interaction between the problems connected with the domestic transfer 
of resources from the private to the public sector and those created by the external 
constraints was particularly complex and was reflected in a variety of situations. One 
obvious manifestation of such diversity of situations is that between the oil-exporting 
countries and the other economies of the region. As already noted, the relaxation of 
external constraints occurred mainly in the non-oil-exporting countries, which benefited 
both by substantial rises in the prices and volumes of their exports and by the 
reduction in the price of imported petroleum. The oil-exporting countries, in contrast, 
have been facing the classic problem of the 1980s of having to simultaneously struggle 
with weak external demand, high debt servicing and scanty access to net external 
financing. 
A second significant difference derives from certain institutional characteristics of 
the export sector. On the one hand, there are the countries where the public sector 
owns the main export activities. In these countries there is a direct link between the 
capacity to transfer resources to the exterior and the financial situation of the public 
sector. Thus, when the value of their exports falls (as generally occurred in 1988 in the 
oil-exporting countries) there is a tendency for the fiscal deficit to grow and the 
external imbalance to worsen, thereby generating inflationary pressures and recessionary 
effects. Conversely, the rise in the value of the exports produced by State enterprises 
tends to bring about a direct and simultaneous improvement in the balance-of-payments 
and the fiscal accounts, thus permitting greater growth and lower inflation. This is 
exactly the case, for example, with copper in Chile. 
The situation of such countries is structurally different from that of others (such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) where the main exports are produced by the 
private sector. In these latter countries, the improvement in exports naturally strengthens 
the balance of payments. As the additional foreign exchange is received by the private 
sector, however, unless mechanisms exist or are established for enabling the State to 
share in a substantial part of the export earnings, the easing of external constraints 
will not necessarily be reflected in an appreciable reduction in the public deficit. Indeed, 
if this relaxing of the foreign exchange constraint results from an expansion in the 
volume of exports brought about by a higher real exchange rate, this may even lead to 
an increase in the public deficit because of the greater domestic-currency cost of 
servicing the external public debt in such circumstances. 
Finally, it should be noted that there are substantial differences between the 
countries, depending on whether one focuses on the external situation in the short or in 
the long term. Thus, the relatively easier external situation enjoyed this year by some 
economies of the region depends heavily on the stability of both the current prices of 
their exports and the levels of international interest rates; elements which have been 
notoriously volatile in recent years. Moreover, the degree of the external constraint also 
depends on the ratio of the debt to output, which is, in contrast, relatively constant in 
the short and even the medium term. Thus, for example, two of the countries (Chile and 
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Uruguay) which are enjoying a relatively easier, short-term external situation at present 
—partly because of the marked improvement in their terms of trade in 1988-- are among 
those where the relative burden of the external debt is highest: 90% of gross domestic 
product, compared with an average of the order of 60% for the rest of the region (see 
table 5). Only Colombia and Brazil meet the criteria of having both a diversified export 
structure and a lower ratio of debt to output, which tends to make the degree of 
external imbalance in the short term more similar to the long-term imbalance. 
In short, in recent years the debt crisis has meant that in practice priority has 
been given to achieving external equilibrium at the expense of growth and price stability. 
As may be gathered from the preliminary results for the first half of 1988, however, 
even if such an effort were successful and the external imbalance was reduced, this need 
not necessarily be reflected in the resumption of sustained growth and a slowing of 
inflation. In order for these to take place, it is necessary to reduce the external 
transfer and at the same time to increase the domestic transfers, for the reduction of 
the first-named of these elements is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
achieving steady growth and controlling inflation. Such an objective calls also for other 
measures, including control of the fiscal deficit, since very high rates of inflation lead to 
a weakening of public management, loss of confidence and credibility, and even to the 
danger of eroding the bases of democracy. 
Inflation 
With few, albeit noteworthy, exceptions (above all Mexico), the resurgence of inflation 
observed in 1987 continued during the first half of 1988. In Nicaragua, where price 
increases over the last 12 months exceed 4000%, this process is well on the way to 
hyperinflation, while in Brazil and Peru it is reflected in rates of inflation considerably 
greater than the previous recorded levels. In Argentina, the monthly rates of price 
increases came close in mid-1988 to the record levels reached in 1985 (see figure 1) and 
led to the adoption of a new stabilization programme in August. Much less dramatic, but 
nevertheless significant —in view of the rates of price increases to which these countries 
were accustomed— were the cases of renewed inflation in Ecuador, the Dominican 
Republic and some Central American countries. Although inflation in Bolivia was still 
quite moderate, it nevertheless registered an annual rate (20%) which was double that 
observed in 1987. 
A number of factors were responsible for this acceleration of inflation: exchange 
rate increases; freeing of controlled prices; adjustment of the public sector's service 
charges; reduction in State subsidies; wage pressures, and, in particular, the element of 
inertia represented by indexation. In some countries, an additional factor which 
interlinked with these and was difficult to regulate was the loss of credibility of the 
economic policy and the consequent volatility and acceleration of inflationary 
expectations. As already noted, however, in all cases the resurgence of inflation was also 
associated with difficulty in controlling the fiscal accounts. Generally speaking, most 
countries have made efforts to check public spending (although these have all too often 
been centered on the reduction of investment, which compromises future growth) and to 
expand tax revenue, but the results of these efforts have been insufficient. 
Thus, in quite a few cases revenue has tended to fall in real terms because of the 
inevitable difference between nominal taxation and real tax revenue caused by 
7 
acceleration of inflation, as well as the greater possibilities of evasion when inflation 
reaches very high levels. Likewise, the deficit of the public sector as a whole has tended 
to rise, in widely differing situations and despite greater control of the central 
government deficit, due to increases in the deficits of State enterprises, Central Bank 
losses because of exchange rate or interest rate differentials, subsidies to State banks (in 
order to purchase the portfolios of bad debts of private banks), or grants made to 
finance the deficits of State and provincial governments. 
Not all the developments in this field have been negative, however. Inflation went 
down in Venezuela and declined even more in Chile (see figure 2), while in Mexico it has 
gone down from rates of 15% per month at the beginning of the year to 2% or less since 
May. In this respect it is significant that although the Mexican stabilization programme 
includes a policy of price and wage controls (expressed in a joint agreement between 
entrepreneurs, workers and the government), this programme was begun when the public 
sector operational deficit had already been turned into a surplus. In other words, as well 
as using price controls to eliminate inertial inflation and to co-ordinate and guide the 
expectations of the economic agents, thus minimizing the risk of recession involved in an 
anti-inflation policy, policies have also been applied in order to exercise strict control 
over aggregate demand. 
The external sector and the transfer of resources 
If the trends of the first half of the year are maintained, the current account deficit of 
the region is likely to be reduced from the US$12 billion registered in 1987 to some 
US$7 billion in 1988 (see table 2). As factor service payments will probably be higher, 
because of the rise in international interest rates, all of this reduction will be due to 
the expansion (by about one-third) of the trade surplus. This improvement in the 
merchandise trade balance is concentrated in the non-oil-exporting countries, and 
especially in Brazil (whose merchandise trade surplus will go up from US$11 billion to 
almost US$17 billion); Argentina (from US$900 million to some US$3 billion) and Chile 
(from US$1.2 billion to nearly US$2 billion). In contrast, the trade surpluses of the 
oil-exporting countries will go down, except in the case of Ecuador, which had registered 
a trade deficit in 1987 because of the prolonged interruption in its petroleum exports 
caused by the earthquake in March of that year. 
The expansion in the trade surplus will take place because the increase in the value 
of exports (13%) will be greater than the growth of imports (7%) and because the level 
of exports was already much higher than that of imports (see table 2). The rise in the 
value of exports reflects the increases (of the order of 10%-30%) in the prices of metals 
and almost all foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials, except for some tropical 
products and petroleum, where prices fell by 15% (see table 3). Factors contributing to 
the rise in raw material prices have been the drought in the United States, the changes 
being made in the agricultural policies of the European Economic Community, the low 
stocks of metals, and the expansion of economic activity in Asia and Europe (which are 
net importers of raw materials). How long this increase lasts will depend on how 
permanent these changes are: obviously, drought is only a temporary phenomenon, and 
the effects of the subsequent rains in agricultural areas of the United States have 
already begun to be felt in the recent declines in the international prices of some 
agricultural products. 
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Not only has there been an improvement in many export prices, but there has also 
been a continued increase in the volume of exports, especially of manufactures. The value 
of such exports has increased by 54% in Brazil, 35% in Chile, 30% in Ecuador and 22% in 
Mexico. A noteworthy feature, in this respect, is that this year both Mexico and Brazil 
will export probably US$3 billion of transport equipment alone. There will also be an 
increase in the volume of agricultural exports (soya beans and wheat in Argentina, Brazil 
and Paraguay and fruit in Chile). Among the reasons for the favourable response of the 
exportable supply in these areas to the better international market conditions are the 
elimination of export taxes (Argentina) and the improvement in the domestic relative 
prices of foodstuffs. Much of the growth in the volume of exports of manufactures is due 
to the high level of real exchange rates, together with the increase in the exportable 
surpluses brought about by the decline in domestic demand (in Brazil and Mexico). 
It is estimated that there will also be a rise in imports, of approximately 7% in 
value and some 3% in volume. With the exception of Mexico --where imports have 
increased by around 50%— however, the value of imports of other countries have not 
grown significantly. The few increases registered (apart from the case of Mexico) are 
concentrated in the countries with greatest economic growth. The very marked increase 
in Mexico's imports is due to the drastic tariff liberalization policy of that country and 
also to the gradual erosion of the real exchange rate brought about by the current 
stabilization programme, and it has also been facilitated by the large supply of 
international reserves. 
The greater trade surplus that the region will obtain will not necessarily be 
reflected in an equivalent increase in the transfer of resources to the exterior. Such a 
situation would be consistent with the greater priority which the countries have been 
giving to the use or accumulation of their available foreign exchange to back up 
economic recovery or a more sustained growth in the future. In this respect, it is worth 
noting that although Brazil has raised its moratorium, it has insisted on securing 
additional net financing amounting to US$5.2 billion, even though it has registered the 
biggest trade surplus in its history. With this surplus, it could pay the whole of the 
interest on the debt, but only at the cost of the stagnation of economic activity, which 
is unacceptable to the country. Similarly, although Argentina could finance a larger 
proportion of its interest commitments with the surplus it will obtain this year, it has 
insisted on paying only half of them from its own resources and financing the rest with 
new loans. In the case of Mexico, although this country has an adequate external 
balance, this is very sensitive to fluctuations in oil prices, and it seems improbable that, 
in the face of a further fall in such prices, the country would choose to cut down 
imports of goods which are essential for growth rather than reduce the transfer of 
resources to the exterior. When faced with similar options in 1987, Ecuador and the 
Dominican Republic partially suspended their servicing of the debt, as Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Peru and other countries had done before them. 
Thus, in spite of the somewhat easier external situation of some countries in 1988, 
many of them would appear to be arriving at the conclusion that the cost of complying 
strictly with their debt servicing commitments and trying to grow on the basis of the 
remaining foreign exchange may be greater than the cost of only partial debt servicing. 
Indeed, half of them have already felt constrained to reduce their debt servicing 
unilaterally. As a counterpart of the foregoing, and in clear recognition by the market of 
the difficulty of collecting the debt in its totality, the average quotation of Latin 
American debt paper has fallen to 44% on its nominal value in the secondary market. 
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In conclusion, if there is a continuation of the tendencies shown in the first half of 
the year towards dynamic growth of exports, modest growth of imports, and little 
variation in the total amount of transfers to the exterior, the region as a whole should 
close the year with a higher level of international monetary reserves. This suggests that 
the viability of the reactivation and stabilization efforts may be enhanced in 1989. 
The debt burden 
The trends noted in the first half of the year indicate that the region's external debt 
—of the order of US$410 billion— will probably grow very little this year. This would be 
the result of five factors. Firstly, if the revaluation of the dollar which has taken place 
so far this year is maintained, the debt denominated in other currencies would fall in 
dollar terms (by some US$7 billion to US$10 billion). The second factor is the 
reluctance of the commercial banks to increase their exposure in the region. Only Brazil 
(US$5.2 billion) and Colombia (US$1 billion) are likely to receive significant contributions. 
The third factor is that the net credits provided by multilateral financial agencies to the 
region are currently very low. Fourthly, apart from modest increases in indebtedness with 
the commercial banking system, the debt could only increase through suppliers' credits, 
and, because of the slow growth of the region, it is not likely to increase very much in 
this way. Finally, some countries (Bolivia, Chile and Mexico) have repurchased part of 
their debt at a discount, and a larger number of countries have converted external 
commitments into domestic assets. 
Furthermore, as the nominal debt will grow only slightly and dollar inflation will be 
of the order of 4%, the external debt will probably go down both in real terms and as a 
proportion of output. Because of the sharp growth in non-oil exports, the debt/exports 
ratio should go down from approximately 4 to 1 in 1987 to less than 3.5 to 1 in 1988 in 
the case of the non-oil-exporting countries, while the ratio will remain virtually 
unchanged (around 3.6 to 1) in the case of the oil-exporting countries. 
Despite the relative improvement in these indicators of indebtedness, however, their 
levels are still very high. As already noted, between 1982 and 1987 the external 
commitments of the region were equivalent to more than 5% of GDP, and indeed, 3.9% of 
GDP was transferred to the exterior (see table 4). Thus, the problem of the transfer of 
resources to the exterior involved in servicing the debt continues to be a central factor 
which severely limits the long-term development of the region, although of course it is 
not the only limiting factor. As stated earlier, if it does not prove possible to finance 
the domestic transfer properly, the positive effects of a reduction in the external 
transfer may rapidly evaporate. Nevertheless, however, if the transfer to the exterior is 
not reduced, this is bound to have an adverse effect on growth, and the already 
enormous social problems faced by the region will continue to increase and become more 
serious. 
Indeed, the reversal which has taken place in the direction of resource transfers 
has not only limited current output (causing a drop in per capita income), but has fallen 
almost entirely on domestic investment, thus compromising future growth. As may be seen 
from table 5, the drop in investment as a proportion of GDP during the crisis is almost 
equal to the net reversal in transfers in relation to output (six percentage points). 
Moreover, during the prolonged crisis there has been a fall in real wages (and hence in 
consumption) in various countries (above all in Mexico, and to a lesser extent in Chile 
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and Uruguay). This reduction has not had any major effect on saving, however, as was 
expected in many cases, but seems rather to have affected income distribution by making 
it even more inequitable. Consequently, unless there is a substantial and lasting 
improvement in the external environment, servicing the external debt at present in strict 
accordance with its original terms means hindering the recovery of investment, wages and 
employment. 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
Latin America 
Oil-exporting countries b 























Source: ECXAC, on the basis of official data. 
a: Preliminary estimates subject to revision. b: Oil-exporting countries: 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela, c: Non-oil-exportirig countries: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile,Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Hait i , Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 
Table 2 
LATINA AMERICA: BAIANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Billions of dollars) 
Balance on current 
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a: Preliminary estimates subject to revision, b: Excluding transfers. 
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Table 3 
Raw sugar c 
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and July 1988; 
Yearbooks 1981 
and September 1988; Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1986-1988; ECLAC, on the 
basis of official data. 
a: Average January-June. b: Average January-June Mith respect to 1987 average. 
c: Dollar cents per pound. d: Dollars per metric ton. e: Dollars per pound. 
f: Dollars per barrel. * : Average January-May. 
Table 4 






























1987 57 -4 .3 1.4 -2.9 16.6 0.3 
1988 a 55 -4 .4 -1.5 
Source; ECLAC, estimates on the basis of of f ic ia l information. 
These estimates a re but orders of magnitude, since they are quite sens i t ive 
t o how peso output i s valued in do l l a r s . 
Symbols; D = t o t a l external disbursed debt; i + u = net payment of in te res t s 
and p r o f i t s ; INK =• net cap i t a l inflow; T => net t ransfer of resources; 
I = gross domestic investment; GDP = gross domestic product; GDP/H => gross 
domestic product per capi ta . 
a; Preliminary est imates. 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: EFFECT OF DEBT ON INVESTMENT, 
SALARIES, AND OUTPUT 
(Crisis and pre-crisis) a 
Crisis: 1982-87 (Pre-crisis: 1970-81) a 
Debt Investment Cumulative Cumulative variation 
GDP GDP variation of of output 
real salary b per capita b 





































3 ( 56) 
18 ( -1) 
-2 ( 32) 
-13 ( -3) 
... 
-30 ( 15) 
3 (-14) 
-8 (-35) 












Source: ECXAC, estimates on the basis of official information. 
Symbols: Debt = total external disbursed debt; Investment = gross domestic 
investment; GDP = gross domestic product. 
a: Information in parenthesis refers to the pre-crisis period; the other data 
refer to the crisis. b: Since the crisis did not start simultaneously in all 
the countries, cumulative variations have been included for the relevant 
periods in each country, so as to show the effect of adjustment on real 
salaries. Therefore, the figures in the last two columns refer to the 
variation registered between 1981 and 1987 in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
and Ecuador; and, between 1982 and 1987, in the rest of the countries. 
Figure 1 
MONTHLY VARIATIONS IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX IN 
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, MEXICO AND PERU 
(Percentages) 
1986 1987 1988 1986 1987 I 1988 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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Figure 2 
LATTN AMERICA: TWELVE-MONTHLY VARIATIONS IN THE 
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1986 1 1987 i 1988 I 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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ARGENTINA 
During the first half of 1988 there was an increase in the already high rate of inflation 
affecting the economy of Argentina and the fiscal problems grew worse, even though 
there was a reversal of the unfavourable trends in external trade and the overall level of 
activity tended to be maintained. Early in August, the authorities launched a new 
stabilization programme on whose results the course of future economic evolution will 
depend. 
The trade surplus increased once again, after two years of setbacks, thanks to the 
rise in the international prices of certain types of grains, the expansion in the volume of 
agricultural exports, the growing sales of manufactures, and a slight reduction in imports 
(see table 6). In this connection, it is estimated that the merchandise trade balance in 
1988 could be as much as six times that of the previous year, which was US$500 million. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the trade surplus normally covers only part 
of the interest on the external debt, and moreover the level of external reserves is very 
low, while it is considered that the negotiations for obtaining new financing will continue 
to be difficult. 
In mid-1987, another stage of rising inflation began. The freeze in prices and wages 
decreed in October had only temporary effect, and the year closed with a 175% increase 
in the level of prices. In January, inflation flared up once again, and continued to 
accelerate in the following months until it amounted to over 25% in July, at which date 
the cumulative annual increase came to 381% (see table 7). 
During the early months of the year, the policy of freeing prices and incomes was 
accentuated. Collective meetings of the labour force were called to negotiate wages, and 
price controls were gradually relaxed until they were totally eliminated. At the same 
time, the trade exchange rate was devalued in line with inflation and an effort was made 
to raise public service rates faster. The evolution of agricultural prices followed 
international market trends, thus helping to aggravate inflation. Industrial prices, for 
their part, rose more than the average because, inter alia, of attempts to recover profit 
margins and the policy, followed by many firms, of over-adjusting list prices to forestall 
the possible re-application of controls. Most of the wage negotiations were reflected in 
adjustments every two months, which do not seem to have ensured full indexation of 
remunerations (see table 8). 
In the early months of the year, the priority assigned to the reduction of the fiscal 
deficit ran into problems caused by the rapid deterioration in real fiscal income, mainly 
because of the drop in the revenue from the value added tax and the decline in export 
duties. This made necessary severe cuts in real expenditure, in spite of the greater 
commitments due to the granting of wage increases and the larger expenditure on debt 
servicing. Thus, the magnitude of the Treasury deficit, which was of the order of 25% of 
total expenditure at the end of 1987, exceeded 45% in the early months of 1988 (see 
table 9). The restoration of the system of compulsory saving, the introduction of a new 
system of federal sharing in taxes and the suspension of contributions by the Treasury to 
State enterprises made it possible to reduce this gap to 30% of expenditure, but even so 
the management of the fiscal accounts continued to encounter considerable difficulties. 
The evolution of the public finances and the increases in the external surplus 
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strongly influenced monetary policy, which sought to moderate the expansion in liquidity. 
To this end, the reserve requirements of the financial system were raised, which tended 
to increase the quasi-fiscal deficit and to reduce the availability of credit. On the other 
hand, the demand for money contracted in view of the resurgence of inflation. Nominal 
interest rates increased steadily up to July, but in real terms they tended to decline 
(see table 10). 
The decline in real wages and the contraction in public expenditure had an adverse 
effect on domestic demand. Nevertheless, the recessionary trends observed at the end of 
1987 seem to have faded. In the first quarter of the year, the GDP was 3% higher than 
in the same period of the previous year, largely because of the recovery in agricultural 
production and the temporary reactivation of public works (see table 4), while 
manufacturing activity remained virtually unchanged in annual terms (see tables 1 and 3). 
In the second quarter of the year, there seems to have been a decline in industrial sales 
and an increase in stocks, with a slight decline in the sectoral output. 
Early in August, the authorities announced a new stabilization programme designed 
to reduce the inertial inflation caused by the indexation mechanisms and to secure for 
the fiscal accounts (which suffer from a continuous deficit) part of the additional income 
deriving from the increase in international grain prices. An agreement was signed with 
industrial entrepreneurs (subject to revision early in October) whereby prices were to be 
frozen and subsequently adjusted in a concerted manner, a reduction of three percentage 
points in the value added tax being granted in compensation for these measures. The 
fixing of wages was to continue to be subject to collective negotiation between the 
parties, except in the case of the civil service, where the staff were to be given an 
average increase of 25%. Under the terms of the changes made in the foreign exchange 
system, receipts from exports of primary commodities will be converted at the trade or 
official exchange rate, which, after being increased by 11.4%, will remain fixed until 
30 September. Most of the imports, will be paid for at the financial exchange rate 
--which floats at higher levels than the trade rate (see table 11)--, while industrial 
exports will be transacted at a combined exchange rate, the fiscal incentives that they 
enjoy being maintained. The Central Bank will use part of the foreign exchange 
purchased on the commercial market to intervene on the financial market, benefiting 
from the differential between the two exchange rates. It is estimated that the benefit 
obtained will be between 1% and 1.5% of the GDP, thus making up for part of the 
quasi-fiscal deficit. At the same time, the restrictions on a broad range of imports were 
abolished, and new measures were adopted to restrict expansion of the money supply and 
to limit public spending. Public service rates, which were initially increased by 30%, are 
scheduled to remain fixed until the end of September. 
The immediate impact of the measures adopted and the weight of the price increases 
that took place at the end of July was that in August the price index increased by 
almost 26%, but it is expected that in September there will be a significant slowing in 
the rate of inflation. By its very characteristics, the effectiveness of the programme will 
depend essentially on the immediate results that it is capable of achieving, since these 
will modify or intensify the behaviour of the various economic agents. These results will 
also have a significant influence on the level of economic activity as a whole, which in 
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Table 1 
ARGENTINA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Percentage variations) a 
Total 
Agriculture, hunting, 









insurance, real estate 
Community, social and 
personal services 





































































a: With respect to the same period in the preceding year. 
b: Provisional. 
Table 2 
ARGENTINA: CROP FARMING PRODUCTION 
(Thousands of tons) 
Seasons 
1985/1986 1986/1987 1987/1988 

























































































































































Source: ECIAC, on the basis of official data. 
a: Provisional figures. 
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Table 3 


















































I 97.8 -9.1 0.3 0.3 
Source: Central Bank. 
a: At constant 1970 factor prices. b: With respect to the 
preceding quarter. c: With respect to the same quarter of the 
preceding year, d: Average cumulative index with respect to the same 
period in the preceding year. 
Table 4 
ARGENTINA: GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT 
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: UNEMPLOYMENT IN MAIN URBAN AREAS 
(Percentages) 
1985 1986 a 1987 







5.9 4.8 5.2 6.0 
4.9 4.8 4.4 5.4 
4.7 6.4 5.1 4.9 
3.7 4.9 3.3 3.6 
10.2 6.8 7.2 7.3 
11.4 13.6 12.5 15.1 










a: The surveys were performed in June and November in Greater Buenos 
Aires and in May and October in the remaining cities, b: Unemployment 
rate aggregate of Greater Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, Rosario, 
Tucuman and a number of medium and large cities. c: Corresponds to 
the Province of Tucuman, including rural areas. 
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Table 6 




































































































































































































































a: With respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
Table 7 
ARGENTINA: PRICE INDEXES 
(Percentage variations) 
Consumer price index 
1987 1988 
Wholesale price index 
1987 1988 

























































































































Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses. 
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Table 8 




1986 1987 1988 
Percentage 
variation 1988/87 













































































Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses. 
a: Peal average monthly wage for industrial workers, excluding 
bonuses, b: Index of nominal wages deflated by consumer price index. 
c: Percentage variation in the cumulative average index, with respect 
to the same period in the preceding year, d: Variation with respect 
to the same month in the preceding year, e: Figure affected by a 
strong decrease of working hours, caused by strikes. 
Table 9 
ARGENTINA: NATIONAL TREASURY INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Millions of Australes a Percentage variation b 
Expenditure Expenditure 
Current Deficit Financing Current 
income Total Interest by income Total Interests 
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Central Bank and other 
sources.' 
a: Effective monthly rates (monthly average). b: Rates for 30-day 
deposits. On October 15, 1987, regulated rate deposits were 
eliminated, c: Weighted average of rates paid for 7-day, 15-day, and 
30-day deposits. d: Rates for 7-day loans. e: Related to the 
consumer price index (general level) corresponding to the month of the 
effective date of the deposits, f: Related to the wholesale price 
















ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE RATE 
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etary Fund. International Financial 
a: Index of nominal exchange rate deflated by the wholesale price index 
and adjusted by the United States wholesale price index, b: Uniformed 
exchange rate, up to October 15, 1987. 
BRAZIL 
A sharp upsurge in inflation, the worsening of the recessionary situation which had 
arisen in the middle of the previous year and an excellent performance by the external 
sector were the most striking features of the Brazilian economy in the first half of 1988 
(see figure 1). Economic policy concentrated on reducing the public sector deficit and 
restoring links with the international financial system, and in August an agreement was 
signed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which laid down quantitative goals as 
regards public financing and provided for the resumption of payment of Brazil's 
commitments to the creditor banks. 
The gross domestic product may stagnate or even go down in 1988, after having 
expanded by over 8% in 1986 and almost 3% in 1987. Manufacturing --which shrank by 5% 
in the first half of the year-- and construction have been the activities most affected by 
the recession (see table 1). The decline in these sectors —due to the declines in 
consumption and investment-- contributed in turn to the fact that unemployment rates in 
the main urban centres were slightly higher in the first half of the year than in the 
corresponding period of the year before and that in the same period industrial 
employment in São Paulo went down by rather more than 3% (see tables 2 and 3). In 
contrast, the situation was more favourable in rural areas, which benefitted from record 
harvests and the considerable rises in the international prices of such commodities as 
soya beans and sugar. 
In August, annual inflation was close to 500% --the highest in the country's history 
(see table 4). In view of the worsening inflation, there was a reversal late in 1987 in the 
economic policy approach which had prevailed since the introduction of the Plan Cruzado. 
The Government's efforts were now concentrated on reducing the fiscal deficit, which 
had become the main disturbing element in previous stabilization programmes. At the 
same time, controls on prices and public service charges were slackened, but the 
machinery for indexing wages, the exchange rate and financial assets, which had been 
reintroduced in mid-1987, was left unchanged. An effort was thus made to reverse the 
loss of credibility caused by the failure of the previous two stabilization schemes, which 
had been based mainly on a price freeze. 
In order to reduce the imbalance in the government accounts, substantial public 
spending cuts were ordered; the wages of officials of the central government 
administration and federal enterprises were frozen for 60 days; the prices and charges 
for the goods and services provided by public enterprises were raised; the subsidies on 
agricultural credit and on the marketing of wheat were eliminated; the procedures and 
time limits for the collection of the main taxes were changed, and financial assistance to 
State and municipal governments was reduced. In addition, in order to control liquidity, a 
severe monetary policy was applied which caused a rise in real interest rates. 
Wage correction continued to be carried out monthly in accordance with the 
evolution of the Price Reference Unit, which is calculated on the basis of the average 
variation in prices during the preceding three months, thus tending to bring about a 
deterioration in real wages when inflation is accelerating. Unionized workers with 
greater bargaining power managed to secure additional adjustments, however, and thus 
maintained the purchasing power of their wages. In contrast, the measures taken to 
contain expenditure at the federal, State and municipal levels have resulted in a 
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significant drop in real wages in the public sector. Thus, the overall index of real wages 
went down, and this had a negative influence on private consumption. 
In the first five months of the year, inflation remained within the range of 18% per 
month laid down as a target in the agreements with the International Monetary Fund, 
but afterwards it accelerated significantly to 24% in July and nearly 21% in August. This 
aggravation of the inflationary process is partly attributable to factors beyond the 
control of the authorities, such as the rise in the international prices of agricultural 
products and seasonal variations in the domestic prices of certain foodstuffs. A 
considerable influence has also been exerted, however, by the unfavourable evolution of 
inflationary expectations. In addition, the anti-inflation policy was hindered by the 
accumulation of a substantial surplus on the trade account which made it more difficult 
to control domestic liquidity. Furthermore, there are no clear signs of any significant 
reduction in the fiscal deficit, despite the various corrective measures adopted. In view 
of the size and complexity of the Brazilian public sector, it is difficult for the federal 
authorities to maintain effective control over expenditure. Moreover, the dizzy rise in 
prices has encouraged the replacement of currency by indexed assets, specially federal 
securities, which makes the public sector financing problems worse by reducing the 
inflationary tax on real monetary balances and increasing the cost of the domestic public 
debt. 
In contrast with the setbacks as regards inflation and growth, the external accounts 
evolved very favourably. In July, the trade surplus accumulated over the last 12 months 
was close on US$17 billion: an unprecedented figure, equivalent to almost 5% of the gross 
domestic product (see table 5). The factors responsible for this result were the decline in 
imports caused by the recession and the drop in petroleum prices, and, above all, the 
increase in exports. In the first half of the year, the latter rose by 36%, due largely to a 
spectacular increase of 54% in exports of industrial products, especially transport 
equipment and metal products and machinery (see table 7). 
With regard to the normalization of Brazil's relations with the international 
financial system, which had been affected by the unilateral moratorium declared in 
respect of external debt servicing, negotiations were resumed with the International 
Monetary Fund and the creditor banks, and these culminated in a stand-by credit 
agreement for US$1.4 billion, the rescheduling of US$63 billion of debt owed to the 
commercial banks, and the granting of new loans for US$5.2 billion. In addition, 
negotiations with the Paris Club permitted the refinancing for a period of 10 years of 
the outstanding commitments in respect of both principal and interest, including those 
falling due up to March 1990. Thanks to these agreements and to the conversion of some 
US$3 billion of debt into direct investment, the transfer of resources to the exterior this 
year will be the lowest since 1982. 
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Figure 1 
BRAZIL: QUARTERLY EVOLUTION OF THE MAIN 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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and Statistical Institute (IBGE) and Industrial Federation of 
the State of Sao Paulo (FIESP). 
a: Variation with respect to the previous month, b: Variation with 
respect to the same month in the previous year, c: Cumulative variation 
with respect to the same period in the previous year. 
Table 2 
BRAZIL: MANUFACTURING SECTOR EMPDDYMENT AND REAL WAGE 




Year 12 months a 
Real Real 
Employment wage b Employment wage Employment 
Real 
wage 
1987 1988 1987 1988 1987 1988 1987 1988 1987 1988 1987 1988 
Jan 107.7 104.7 165.6 161.1 8.0 -2.8 4.6 -2.7 8.0 -2.8 4.6 -2.7 



















104.8 182.7 167.7 
104.6 182.7 176.8 
104.5 175.4 184.7 













Dec 104.7 170.3 2.5 -5.1 -2.3 -3.9 
Source; ECIAC, on the basis of figures from the Industrial Federation of 
the State of Sao Pablo (FIESP). 
a; With respect to the same month of the preceding year, b: Nominal wages 
deflacted by the consumer price index of Sao Paulo (ICV-SP). 
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Table 3 
BRAZIL: RATES OF OPEN tMMPLOYMENT 
(Percentages) 
1987 
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4 . 0 
4 . 4 
4 . 5 
4 . 2 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
3 . 6 
2 . 9 
3 .8 
4 . 3 
4 . 3 
4 . 1 
4 . 0 
3 .9 
Río de 
J ane i ro 
2 . 9 
3 .3 
3 . 1 
2 . 8 




3 . 5 
3 .4 
3 . 1 
2 . 3 









3 . 1 
3 . 1 
3 . 5 
3 .8 
4 . 5 
4 . 6 
4 . 6 
4 . 0 
4 . 2 
3 .8 
2 . 8 
4 . 0 
4 . 7 
4 . 6 
4 .2 
4 . 4 
4 . 0 
Belo 
Horizonte 
3 . 5 
4 . 0 
3 .0 
3 .8 
4 . 5 
4 . 9 
4 . 7 
4 . 1 
4 . 1 
3 . 5 
3 .7 
3 .3 
4 . 3 
4 . 3 
4 . 1 
4 . 4 
4 . 6 
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4 . 3 
5 .0 
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4 . 3 
3 .9 
3 .7 
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from the Getulio Va: 
1988 
Month Year 12 Ms. 
16.5 16.5 364.8 
18.0 37.4 380.9 
16.0 59.4 387.9 
19.3 90.2 381.1 
17.8 124.0 359.9 
19.5 167.7 336.1 
24.0 232.2 424.9 
20.7 300.7 495.5 
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Imports fob 
Percentage 


































































































































































a: With respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
Table 6 

















1987 1988 a 
15 052 5 969 5 605 100.0 100.0 7.2 -6.1 
3 859 1 606 1 405 26.9 25.1 38.5 -12.5 
11 193 4 363 4 200 73.1 74.9 -0.6 -3.7 
1 517 703 473 11.8 8.4 -24.0 -32.7 
5 718 2 282 2 136 38.2 38.1 -3.5 -6.4 
3 958 1 377 1 592 23.1 28.4 14.3 15.6 
Source: ECIAC, on the basis of figures from the External Trade Center of 
Studies Foundation. 
a: January-May 1988 with respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
29 
Table 7 
BRAZIL: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS, FOB 
Millions Of 
dollars 








1987 1988 a 
26 213 106 531 15 4965 100.0 100.0 17.1 45.5 Total 
Basic products 8 020 
Coffee beans 
Iron ore l 563 
Soya meal and cake 1 450 
Soya beans 570 
Others 4 437 
Industrial products 18 008 
Semimanufacturers 3 177 
Manufactures 14 831 
Transport equipment 2 780 
Mach., boilers and 
mechanical app. 1 634 
Mach., and elec. app. 888 
Footwear l 169 
Orange juice 832 
Steel manufactures 501 
Others 7 027 
Other products 185 
3 516 





























































0.1 0.1 6.9 65.2 
Source: Bank of Brazil. 
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EXCHANGE RATE 



































































a: Index of the nominal exchange rate deflated by the wholesale price 
index and adjusted by the United States wholesale price index. 
*: Had the nominal exchange rate been deflated by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), as is dene by the Brazilian authorities, the adjusted real 
exchange rate would have remain constant during 1988. 
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Table 9 
BRAZIL: MONEY SUPPLY AND MONETARY BASE 
(Percentage variations) 
Money supply Monetary base a 

































































































Source: Central Bank. 
a: Defines as the sum of the monetary liabilities of the monetary 
authorities: currency outside banks, deposits of commercial banks and 
current account deposits. The monetary authorities include not only the 
Central Bank but also the Banco do Brasil, which plays an important role 
as a development bank, b: With respect to December of the preceding 
year, c: With respect to the same month of the preceding year. 
Table 10 
BRAZIL: MONTHLY INTEREST RATES 
(Percentages) 
Deposits Loans 
Open market Deposits Savings Working Consumer 






















































































































Source: ECIAC, on the basis of official data. 
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COLOMBIA 
The performance of the Colombian economy during the first part of this year was 
characterized mainly by the continued growth of production, a considerable increase in 
the inflow of capital —which offset the deterioration in the current account balance--, 
a slight increase in the rate of inflation, and expansion of the fiscal deficit. 
Production continued to expand, although somewhat more slowly than in the first 
half of 1987. The decline in the growth rate of coffee production will reduce agricultural 
growth, although it is expected that output from the rest of this sector will increase. 
Petroleum production fell by over 4% because of guerrilla attacks on the oil pipelines, 
but other mining production continued to expand (see table 2). Construction was 
adversely affected by the stagnation in public investment, which was used as an element 
in the control of inflation, by difficulties with financing and with the supply of 
materials. These latter particularly affected the construction of dwellings. In contrast, 
manufacturing continued to grow at a rapid rate, as in the previous two years (see 
table 1), despite the rise in financial costs and credit restrictions. The unemployment 
rate in the four main cities rose during the first quarter, but declined again in the 
second quarter (see table 3). 
During the first half of the year, inflation rose moderately but persistently 
(see table 4), due mainly to shortages in food supplies on account of climatic conditions. 
Despite the larger imports of food and the restrictive monetary policy which was applied, 
it is estimated that the cumulative rise in consumer prices up to December will be 
somewhat greater than in 1987. The resurgence of inflation and the fact that, as is 
usual, the adjustment to the legal minimum wage made in January 1988 was the only one 
scheduled for the entire year meant that the minimum wage suffered a marked 
deterioration in real terms. Real average wages also went down, although only slightly 
(see table 6). 
The exchange rate policy sought to maintain the real exchange rate, although the 
rise in the rate of inflation during the first half of the year caused the exchange rate to 
fall slightly below the levels reached in 1987 (see table 5). 
Because of the rapid increase in imports, the merchandise trade surplus contracted 
substantially (see table 7). External sales continued to grow, thanks to the dynamism of 
non-coffee exports, and especially exports of mining sector products, which increased in 
volume and were also favoured by price rises. This expansion was offset to some extent, 
however, by the drop in the volume and prices of petroleum exports and the decline in 
coffee sales. Although coffee prices rose, the volume of exports had to be limited under 
the terms of the International Coffee Agreement. The considerable increase in imports, 
for its part, was due to the larger purchases of foodstuffs and capital goods, which were 
stimulated by the relaxation of quantitative controls. 
During the first seven months of the year there was a deficit in the services and 
other transfers account, which was almost double that registered in the same period of 
1987. The basic reason for this was the decline in net transfers. Furthermore, there was 
a moderate increase in payments of profits and interest. 
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The balance-of-payments current account for the seven-month period thus showed a 
small deficit, in contrast with the large surplus registered the year before. This deficit 
was more than offset, however, by the radical turnabout in the capital account; the large 
deficit of almost US$465 million in the period January-July 1987 was turned into a 
surplus of over US$430 million. The bulk of the external financing obtained by the 
country included the approximately US$1 billion provided by the international private 
banking system under the "Concorde" credit arrangements. These resources also made 
possible an increase in the level of international reserves, which stood in July 1988 at 
a level equivalent to nearly one year's imports (see table 8). 
In contrast, there was a deterioration in the fiscal situation in the first half of the 
year. Even though central government income grew satisfactorily and there was thus an 
apparent consolidation of the achievements of the 1986 tax reform, the big increase in 
current expenditure (including debt servicing) caused current saving to drop to only half 
its previous level, and although investment expenditure grew only very slightly in nominal 
terms, the overall deficit in the first half of the year was almost four times that for the 
same period of 1987. The necessary financing came from a reduction in the Treasury 
balances, since the net amortization of the external public debt continued (see table 9). 
In the rest of the public sector, the State enterprises continued to have recourse to the 
External Debt Servicing Fund, causing consequent pressure on the global deficit and on 
the money supply. Thus, it is estimated that this year the public sector deficit will be 
double that of 1987, which was equivalent to 1.6% of the gross domestic product. 
Restriction of liquidity was one of the main instruments used to contain the 
growing inflation, but it brought with it a rise in interest rates. Because of the checks 
imposed on deposits in the financial system for tax purposes, the public began to use 
cash for its transactions, resulting in a drop in the volume of financial intermediation in 
the first quarter of 1988. The phenomenon was heightened by a restrictive monetary 
policy and was reflected in an increase in the effective interest rate on deposits to more 
than 35% (see table 10), while the rate on loans was close to 45%. Although the tax 
checks were ended in April, liquidity and interest rates continued to be pressured by the 
restrictive nature of the monetary policy. 
At the end of August, when it appeared that the upward trend in inflation was 
under control, the Central Bank intervened in the financial market and fixed maximum 
interest rates of 31.6% on deposits and 41.9% on loans, as well as announced that there 
would be a review of interest rates on official securities. At the same time, it reduced 
the compulsory bank reserve rate in order to relieve the lack of liquidity, since up to 
July the growth in the money supply over the past 12 months had been only 24%, 
compared with the 30% rise in prices. 
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Figure 1 
COLOMBIA: QUARTERLY EVOLUTION OF THE MAIN 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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National Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s (DANE). 
1988 
Month 12MS. b 
-9 .3 5.2 
18.3 12.0 
2.6 4.4 
-3 .9 8.0 







a: Except coffee thrash. b: With respect to the same month of the 
preceding year. c: With respect to the same period of the preceding 
year. 
Table 2 
COLOMBIA: INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(January-June) 





Crude oil a 
Gold b 
Silver b 
Iron ore c 
Manufacturing 
Sugar c d 
Cement c e 
Steel ingots c 










































2976.5 4370.5 4279.6 46.4 -2.1 
Source: Banco de la República and National Bureau of Statistics 
(DANE). 
a: Millions of barrels. b: Thousands of troy ounces. 
c: Thousands of tons. d: January-March. e: January-April. 
f : Thousands of units. g: Thousands of square metres. 
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Table 3 
COKMBIA: RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
1986 1987 1988 
March June Sept. Dec. March June Sept. Dec. March June 
Total 14.3 15.0 13.3 12.5 13.4 12.1 11.3 10.1 12.6 11.7 
Bogota 14.3 14.2 12.6 11.5 13.0 12.0 10.5 8.9 12.2 11.0 
Barranquilla 16.0 18.1 15.8 15.6 16.1 11.9 13.6 10.2 13.2 11.0 
Cali 12.4 13.5 12.6 12.1 13.8 12.4 12.7 10.6 11.9 12.4 
Medellin 15.1 17.2 14.6 14.0 12.4 12.5 11.1 12.9 14.4 13.5 















COIOMBIA: PRICE INDEX 
(Percentage variations) 
Consumer price index 
1987 1988 
Wholesale price index 
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21.1 3.0 3.0 
19.8 4.0 7.2 
20.4 2.9 10.3 
19.8 3.9 14.6 
22.7 1.7 16.8 
24.8 2.4 19.3 
26.7 1.4 21.1 
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from the International Monetary 
Fund. 
a: Index of the nominal exchange rate, deflated by the wholesale price 
index and adjusted by the United States wholesale price index. 
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Table 6 













































































a: Monthly variation. b: Accumulated year. c: With respect to 
the same period of the preceding year. 
Note: Total industrial sector, except coffe thrash. 
Table 7 
COKMBIAr BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Mil l ions of do l l a r s ) 
Balance on current account 
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COLOMBIA: NET ETTERNATIONAL RESERVES 




















Source: Banco de la República. 





































correspond to July. 
Table 9 
COLOMBIA: NATIONAL' GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE a 
(January-June) 
Current income (net) a 
Total payments 
Operating expenditure 





Net external credit b 
Net domestic credit b 
Reduction in cash holdings 






























































Source: ECIAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the National 
Planning Department. 
a: Tax resources of the special exchange account are not included. 
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a: Comparable with the corresponding weighted effective rate. 




The Chilean economy, helped by a very substantial rise in the terms of trade, performed 
favourably during the first half of 1988. Exports reached record levels, the 
balance-of-payments current account closed with a surplus for the first time since 1976, 
the international reserves increased, and the external debt declined. In this context, 
a more expansive economic policy than in previous years was applied, possibly influenced 
by the plebiscite scheduled for the last quarter of the year. The gross domestic product 
and employment increased, while there was a significant decline in inflation and a partial 
recovery in real remunerations (see figure 1). 
The value of exports increased by 44% in the first half of the year compared with 
the same period in the previous year (see table 10). This situation was particularly 
favoured by the sharp rise in the international price of copper --a commodity which 
accounts for 40% of total exports-- and in the prices of such industrial exports as 
timber, paper, wood pulp and fish meal. This increase in the value of exports was also 
due to the continued expansion in the volume of external sales, encouraged by the 
consistently export-oriented nature of economic policy, including the maintenance of a 
high real exchange rate (see table 11). At the same time, imports continued to rise (18%), 
albeit more slowly than exports. As in the previous year, the most dynamic categories in 
this field were capital goods and intermediate goods (see table 12). 
As a result of these developments there was a marked increase in the trade surplus. 
By the first half of 1988, it had already surpassed the level reached in the previous year, 
and it had also exceeded the net remittances of interest and profits and payments for 
non-financial services. Consequently, the current account results displayed a turnaround 
from a deficit of nearly US$580 million in the first half of 1987 to a surplus of 
US$100 million in the first half of 1988. In turn, this change permitted the international 
reserves to rise by more than US$200 million although during the same period the net 
inflow of capital declined by over US$400 million (see table 13). 
If the terms of trade registered in the first half of the year are maintained for the 
rest of 1988, the extra income from this alone could amount to US$1.3 billion. In 
addition, it should be noted that the payment of US$400 million of interest commitments 
was postponed from this year as a result of the renegotiation of the debt agreed upon in 
1987. When both these factors are taken into account the total of US$1.7 billion 
amounts approximately to 8% of the GDP, an amount equivalent to the country's normal 
commitments in respect of interest payments. 
The improved external situation and the coherent manner in which macroeconomic 
factors have been handled have made possible a solid expansion in economic activity. 
After having exceeded in 1987 the previous record level which it had reached in 1981, 
the gross domestic product grew by 5.8% in the first half of 1988, this fact 
notwithstanding, the per capita product was still 2% below that of 1981. The expansion 
was particularly marked in commerce, manufacturing and basic services (see table 1). 
Owing to the expansion of economic activity, employment rose by 4%. This was reflected 
in the decline in the rate of open unemployment from an average of 9.6% in the first 
half of 1987 to 8.8% in the same period of 1988 (see table 6) and in the drastic 
reduction in the number of persons enrolled in the Government's emergency employment 
plans to less than 1% of the labour force by mid-year. 
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The expansion of economic activity, the boom in external trade and especially the 
considerable increase in the value of exports of copper (a commodity which is produced 
mostly by State enterprises) sharply increased government income. This slack in the fiscal 
situation led the economic authorities to implement reductions in various taxes, in line 
with the strategy of limiting the size of the State sector and favouring the private 
sector as the basic engine of development. Thus, late in 1987 the special tax on colour 
television sets and other consumer durables was eliminated and the tax on the dividends 
of open joint stock companies was reduced by half. So far in 1988, there have been 
reductions in maximum customs tariffs (from 20% to 15%), in the tax on credit (from 2.4% 
to 1.2%), in the special duty on fuels, and in the rate of value added tax (IVA) (from 
20% to 16%). Altogether, these measures represent an annual sacrifice of fiscal resources 
equivalent to more than 3% of the gross domestic product, which in view of the 
above-mentioned increases in income will not endanger the fiscal balance during the 
present year. 
The reductions in taxes and tariffs, together with the lowering of the domestic 
prices of petroleum and wheat, against the background of balanced public sector 
accounts, contributed to a decline in inflation. The latter had increased slightly but 
consistently between January and November 1987 (when it reached 23% per year), but it 
subsequently went down steadily in 1988 to an annual rate of 13% in August, when 
consumer prices rose by only 0.8% (see table 7). 
The slackening in the rate of inflation and the growth of employment helped in 
turn to significantly raise real wages for the first time since 1981. In the first seven 
months of the year, average real remunerations were 6.8% higher than those registered 
in the corresponding period of 1987 (see table 8). Although, given the sharp drop 
suffered in 1983, they were still 7% lower than in the period 1981-1982. The gap was 
even greater in the case of the minimum wage, which, despite having been adjusted in 
September 1987 and again in June 1988, was still 30% lower in real terms in mid-1988 
than in 1981-1982. 
In contrast with 1987, monetary policy was expansive. The annual growth rate of 
the private sector money supply, which had gone down from 45% to 8% between January 
and December of the previous year, rose to 26% in June 1988 (see table 14). Up to 
mid-year, however, the potential effect of this increase on the growth rate of prices was 
apparently neutralized by the greater demand for money due to the decline in 
inflationary expectations and the growth of economic activity. 
Finally, the external debt swaps expanded once again during 1988. In the first seven 
months of the year, these operations amounted to US$1 290 million, so that their 
cumulative total since they were initiated in mid-1985 amounted to almost US$4.6 billion. 
This more than offset the additional indebtedness contracted so far this year; and as a 
result, the external debt declined by almost US$700 million, although it still amounts to 
almost US$20 billion. 
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Figure 1 
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Table 1 
OKIE: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 








































































































a: With respect to the sama period of the preceding year. 



















CHUE: CROP-FARHDK PRODUCTION 
(Crop years) 
Thousands of metric quintals a 

































































































































































































































































Porcentage variation January-May 
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1988/87 -3.2 5.4 -1.5 -3.3 35.6 28.3 52.8 -26.2 
Source: National Statistics Institute (WE). 
a: Thousands of metric tons. b: Metric tons. c: 
d: Crude Iron ore. e: Pellets. f: Thousands of 





CHUE: INDUSTRIAL OUTPOT 
(Percentage variations) 
SOFOFA a INE 
Production Sales Production 
Month 12 Ms. Year Month 12 Ms. Year Month 12 Ms. Year 

































































































































































































Source: National Statist ics Institute (INE); Sociedad de Fomento 
Fabril (SOFOFA). 
a: Figures represent variations of 1980=100 index. b: Variation 
with respect to the preceding month. c: Variation with respect to 
the same month of the preceding year. d: Cumulative variation with 
respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
Table 5 
CHUE: BUIIDING PEFMITS APPROVED AND BUIIDING STARTS 
IN SELECTED COMMUNES a 
Total construction Housing 
Surface Variation c Number Surface Variation c 















































































































Source: National Statistics Institute (INE). 
at New construction projects in the public and private sectors. 
b: Thousands of square metres. c: Cumulative percentage variation with 
respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
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Table 6 
CHILE: UNEMPLOYMENT SATE 
(Quarterly averages) 
Quarters 1986 1987 1988 
ending : : : 

















































































Source; National Statistics Institute (INE). 
Table 7 
ŒHE: PRICE INDEX 
(Percentage variations) 
Consumer price index Wholesale price index 
1987 1988 1987 1988 





































































































































Source: National Statistics Institute (INE). 
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Table 8 














Index of real ' wages 
and salaries a 
(December 1982=100) 




































































































a: Index of nominal wages and salaries deflated by the consumer price 
index. b: Percentage variation in the cumulative average index with 
respect to the same period of the preceding year. c: With respect to 
the same month of the preceding year. 
Table 9 
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Chile and the International Monetary Fund. 
a: Index of the nominal exchange rate deflated by the consumer price 


























CHUE: TRADE BALANCE 















































































































































































































a: with respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
Table 11 
CHILE: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS (FOB) 




















































































































a: Cumulative figures. b: Variation in cumulative value with 
respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
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Table 12 
CHUE: STFUCIURE OF IMPORTS (CTF) 
(Millions of dollars) a 
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S o u r c e : C e n t r a l Bank. 
Goods 
I n t e r m e d i a t e goods 
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P e r c e n t a g e 
v a r i a t i o n b 
Con. I n t . Cap. 
4 . 5 4 0 . 9 2 2 . 2 
3 . 1 1 4 . 8 2 5 . 3 
7 . 8 9 . 9 3 3 . 6 
2 . 5 1 1 . 0 3 1 . 9 
6 .0 1 8 . 1 2 2 . 0 
8 . 0 1 9 . 1 2 1 . 6 
a: Cumulative figures. b: Percentage variation in cumulative value 
with respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
Table 13 
CHUE: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) a 
1987 
I Quarter I I Quarter 
Current account 





Non-financial s e rv i ce s 
F inancia l s e rv i ce s 
Unrequited t r a n s f e r s 
Capi ta l account 
Foreign investment 
Other c a p i t a l 



























































































Source: Central Bank. 
a: Rounded-off figures. 
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Table 14 
CHILE: MONETARY AGGREGATES 






























































































Source; Central Bank. 
Note: E = Money issue? Dl = Ml + Dg = Total money supply? 
Ml = Private sector money supply; Dg » Public sector money supply; 
Dp = Term deposits? M2 «.Ml + Dp? CM - Local currency loans? 
CE = Foreign currency loans. 
a: With respect to the same month of the preceding year. 
Table 15 
CHILE: BANK INTEREST RATES 
(Percentages) 
Nominal rates a Real rates 
Short- Non-readjustable Readjustable 
term Short- operations a operations b 
de- term 
posits loans Short-term Short-term De-
















































































































































Source: Central Bank. 
a: Average monthly rates, b: Annual rates. 
ECUADOR 
The most outstanding features of the Ecuadorian economy in the first half of 1988 were 
the recovery of production from the abnormally low level of the preceding year, with a 
consequent improvement in the trade balance (although not in the overall external sector 
balance), the violent acceleration of inflation, and a sharp rise in the exchange rates. 
It is estimated that the growth in output will be between 5% and 6.5%, due almost 
entirely to the recovery in the production of hydrocarbons after the prolonged 
interruption in oil supplies in 1987 as a result of the damage done by the earthquake 
which ravaged the country in March of that year. In contrast, non-petroleum activities 
are expected to grow by only 1% or 2%. The slight expansion in export agricultural 
activities will probably be offset by the decline in crops for domestic consumption. It is 
also likely that there will be a slackening in the very rapid growth rate observed in the 
fisheries sector in the previous two years, and a similar reduction in the pace of 
stock-raising and forestry activities. During the first part of 1988, manufacturing 
displayed an erratic performance because of the weakness of domestic demand, the 
shortage of foreign exchange and the rising inflation. 
The resumption of the production and export of hydrocarbons was a decisive factor 
in the improvement in the external accounts. Thus, during the first half of the year 
exports exceeded US$1.2 billion: 30% more than in the same period of the previous year. 
Furthermore, the recovery in the production of hydrocarbons meant that it was no longer 
necessary to import this commodity, resulting in a saving of foreign exchange of over 
US$250 million. As a result, the trade deficit registered in mid-1987 was turned into a 
surplus of almost US$470 million (see table 1). 
During the first half of the year, exports of primary commodities grew by 30%, 
compared with a decline of 16% in the same period of 1987. This increase was mainly due 
to the 72% rise in sales of crude petroleum, even though the average price per barrel 
(US$13.7) was lower than the US$17 initially expected. There were also increases in the 
sales of shrimp and coffee (15% in each case) and bananas (7%), despite the 20% decline 
in the unit value of shrimps in the period January-May. Exports of manufactures, for 
their part, grew by nearly 30% (see table 2). 
The resumption of petroleum operations in 1988 caused imports of fuels and 
lubricants to return to their traditional low levels. At the same time, the sharp rise in 
the real exchange rate contributed to the marked decline in imports of consumer goods 
(-27%), while imports of raw materials fell by 19% to more normal levels and purchases 
of capital goods remained practically unchanged (see table 3). 
Despite the trade surplus and the continuation of the moratorium on the servicing 
of the debt owed to the international banking system (which constitutes only a minor 
part of the external debt), the servicing of the debt owed to official agencies, together 
with speculative transactions, caused a decline in the net international reserves, which by 
mid-year had shrunk almost to zero. 
The gap between the exchange rates on the two markets (the free market and that 
subject to government intervention) continued to grow wider, clearly reflecting the 
prevailing climate of uncertainty. In July, the price of the dollar on the free market was 
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over 500 sucres, more than double the rate corresponding to official transactions (see 
table 5). The increases in the exchange rate, which were substantially greater than those 
observed in the first half of 1987, were due largely to speculative operations partly 
associated with uncertainty over the outcome of the elections and the acceleration of 
inflation. As the position with regard to the country's international reserves got worse, 
some changes were made in the operation of the foreign exchange market in order to 
limit the exchange rate rises and in June prior deposits of between 60% and 160% were 
established for imports. 
The external debt situation remained substantially unchanged. The servicing of the 
debt owed to the private banking system was not resumed after petroleum production was 
restarted, while efforts to negotiate the rescheduling of the payments still outstanding to 
private creditors continued, without reaching any definite agroement. Early in the year, a 
credit of US$157 million was received from the IMF, US$57 million of which was 
compensatory financing for the drop in export prices, while the remaining US$ 100 million 
was provided under a stand-by credit agreement for a period of 14 months. Only US$15 
million of this latter amount was disbursed, however, due to the failure to fulfil the 
targets laid down in the agreement for the first quarter. Finally, commitments of some 
US$300 million were renegotiated in the Paris Club. These corresponded to payments of 
principal and interest due in 1987, 1988 and the first two months of 1989. 
The annual rate of change in the consumer price index speeded up, and in August 
amounted to 63%: the highest ever in the country's history. This acceleration of 
inflationary pressures was linked to the rise in the exchange rate and the repercussions 
on the expectations of the economic agents. Another factor which exerted a strong 
influence was the doubling of the growth rate of the money supply (see table 7). In 
addition to these factors, there was the impact of the decrease in the supply of food and 
the increase in public transport charges. 
As a result of the speeding-up of inflation, the purchasing power of wages went 
down. Thus, despite the 31% rise in minimum wages approved in mid-year, in real terms 
these wages were 11% lower in January-July 1988 than in the same period of the year 
before (see table 8). 
At the end of August, the new government instituted a series of measures designed 
to restore the main macroeconomic balances. These included the raising of the 
intervention exchange rate to 390 sucres per dollar and the establishment of a system of 
weekly mini-devaluations designed to raise this exchange rate by a further 30% over the 
space of one year. At the same time, minimum wages were raised by almost 16%. In order 
to reduce the fiscal imbalance, and in keeping with current energy policy, electricity 
charges were increased and the price of gasoline was doubled to the equivalent of 
US$0.36 per gallon. Finally, the prices of some foodstuffs were frozen and it was decided 
not to expand Central Bank credit to the government until December. 
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Table 1 
ECUADOR: TRADE BALANCE 
Millions of dollars Percentage variation a 
Exports Imports Trade 
FOB CIF balance Exports Imports 























































































































































































































Source; Central Bank of Ecuador. 
a: With respect to> the same period of the preceding year. 
Table 2 
ECUADOR: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS 
(Millions of dollars) a 
Primary Industria- Percentage 
lized variation b 
Total Oil Non-oil 












































































































Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
Note: Pr = Primary. In = Industrialized. 
a: Cumulative figures, b: With respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
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Table 3 
ECUADOR: IMPORTS STRUCTURE a 











































































































Cg Fl Rm 
-52.6 -66.7 -19.7 
-40.5 -63.3 -27.5 
-38.9 -74.6 -20.0 
-29.2 -84.9 -28.1 
-26.1 -88.8 -24.9 
-25.7 -88.5 19.3 









a: Classified by economic purpose, b: Cumulative figures. 
the same cumulative period of the preceding year. 
c: With respect to 
Table 4 










































a: Monthly balances, b: With respect to the same month of the preceding year. 





























Average exchange rate 

















































































a: Index of the nominal exchange rate deflated by the consumer price index and 
adjusted by the United States viholesale price index. *: Figures of April-July, 
1988 are not official data. 
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Table 6 










































































Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC), 
Table 7 
ECUADOR: MONETARY AGGREGATES 

















Bank of Ecuador. 


























a: Percentage variations calculated with respect to balances at the end of 
each itonth. b: With respect to Deoeniber of the preceding year, c: With 
respect to the same itonth of the preceding year. *: 1988, July. 
Table 8 
ECUADOR: GENERAL MINIMUM M0NTHLÏ WAGES 



















































































a: With respect to the same month of the preceding year. 
cumulative average of the same period of the preceding year. 
b: With respect to 
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MEXICO 
The evolution of the Mexican economy in the first months of 1988 has been largely 
determined by the strong anti-inflationary stance of economic policy and by the evolution 
of external conditions. Especially significant as concerns the latter, were the weakening 
of petroleum prices and the heavier debt servicing burden arising from higher interest 
rates. The success achieved in the effort to secure a rapid reduction in inflation has had 
as its counterpart a partial reversal in the recovery of the output, a drop in wages and 
a notable increase in imports. 
Up to the end of 1987, the objectives pursued by the authorities were basically 
stabilization and structural adjustment. On the one hand, the aim was to reduce 
inflationary pressures, while on the other it was desired to reduce the weight of the 
public sector in the economy, to further the process of opening-up to the exterior, and 
to promote changes in relative prices that would favour tradeable goods. The persistence 
and even worsening of inflationary pressures (at the end of 1987, prices were rising at 
the rate of over 140% per year) led to the replanning of the economic strategies, 
however. 
Indeed, in the last quarter of the previous year a number of measures had already 
begun to be adopted in order to correct price distortions. In the fiscal field, a system of 
indexing taxes was established in order to correct the cumulative lag observed in the 
evolution of tax revenue. In addition, the tariff reduction process was intensified (the 
maximum tariff went down from 40% to 20%) and the removal of quantitative controls on 
imports was speeded up (only about 6% of imports are still subject to prior licenses). 
Likewise, in December 1987 the prices and rates for the goods and services of State 
enterprises were adjusted and nominal wages were raised by 15%, although even so they 
registered substantial real losses during the year. Furthermore, the controlled exchange 
rate was devalued by 22%, after the 30% devaluation of the free exchange rate which had 
taken place in the previous month, and this made it possible to correct the, by then, 
considerable overvaluation of the peso in real terms. 
The above-mentioned events formed the background to the launching of the 
"Economic Solidarity Pact", which is fundamentally aimed at combatting inflationary 
pressures and which uses as its main instrument the adoption of mechanisms to 
co-ordinate the actions of private enterprise, labour and government. The Pact includes 
highly restrictive domestic credit policies (the marginal reserve requirement has been 
raised to over 100%) and strict fiscal discipline. The adjustment in the public finances is 
expected to permit the primary surplus --i.e., excluding interest on the public debt-- to 
increase to over 8% of the gross domestic product (that is to say, 3.3 percentage points 
more than in 1987). Consequently, programmable expenditure (especially that connected 
with investment) should continue going down. The Economic Solidarity Pact thus makes 
stabilization the main goal of economic policy, and in pursuing this it combines elements 
designed to reverse inflationary expectations (price and wage controls) with more 
orthodox policies to restrict aggregate demand. 
The immediate impact of the correction of relative prices carried out at the end of 
1987 was to double the monthly rate of inflation, which rose to 16% in December and 
January. In April, however, as the measures to freeze wages, the exchange rate, prices of 
public goods and services and many industrial goods came into full effect, inflation began 
to slow down sharply. As from May, the monthly rates of price increases were below 2%, 
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and in August the increase was only 0.9% (see table 2). Moreover, the fiscal adjustment 
was facilitated by the reduction of nominal interest rates (see table 12) and the indexing 
of taxes and the sustained real reduction in programmable expenditure (see table 10). 
The adoption of a virtually fixed exchange rate has led to gradual erosion of the 
margin of undervaluation of the peso. However, the enormous foreign exchange reserves 
built up in 1987 have made it possible to maintain the confidence of exchange market 
operators and to finance a noteworthy increase in imports, in line with the measures to 
increase the openness of the economy. Thus, imports increased by 50% in the first few 
months of 1988, after they had remained at depressed levels for several years (see table 
6). The contraction in petroleum exports, however, has been having a considerable effect 
on foreign exchange income (see table 7). Up to May, external sales of non-traditional 
products continued to rise at a very considerable rate (20%), but this growth later 
slackened. In view of the foregoing, the merchandise trade surplus has already gone down 
by 42% in the first five months of the year, compared with the same period in 1987 (see 
table 6), and it is estimated that by the end of the year the trade surplus could well be 
only a small fraction of that registered the year before, while there might even be a 
deficit on the current account. 
The purchasing power of wages has continued to go down, although its rate of 
decline slackened as the rate of inflation fell (see table 5). Since the adjustment was 
carried out fundamentally by this means, unemployment is still low. It seems likely, 
however, that there will be an increase in unemployment rates in the second half of the 
year, as the trends in the construction and manufacturing sectors already seem to 
indicate (see table 3). 
The recovery in economic activity observed in the second half of 1987 slackened in 
the early months of the present year and came to an almost complete halt in the second 
quarter. Indeed, the growth rate of manufacturing production, which had been almost 9% 
in the last quarter of 1987 and had been over 5% in the period January-March 1988, 
stagnated completely in April-June (see table 1) and has since begun to go down. 
The contraction in public investment and in domestic financing for the private 
sector adversely affected construction activity —which began to go down in March-- and 
the manufacture of capital goods (see table 1). The production of consumer and 
intermediate goods virtually stagnated, but in contrast there was a further rise in the 
growth rate of the assembly industries (maquiladoras), which grew at rates equivalent to 
25% per year. On the other hand, the opening-up of trade and the drop in the real 
exchange rate led to a shift in purchasing power to imports of both consumer goods and 
of inputs and equipment (see table 8). 
In the other sectors of the economy, agricultural production was affected to some 
extent by the delay in the arrival of the rainy season; mining activities stagnated; and 
the tourist sector suffered the adverse effects of the suspension of operations by one of 
the two national airlines. In short, overall economic activity registered growth of only 2% 
in the first half of the year compared with the same period of the year before, while 
there was a significant increase in recessionary trends which could even cause a drop in 
the product for the year as a whole. 
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Figure 1 
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Table 1 
MEXICO: QUARTERIÏ GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT a 
1980 = 100 
1987 1988 b 
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Transport, storing, and 
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Source: ECIAC, on the basis of official information. 
a: Percentage variation with respect to the same period of the 
preceding year, b: Provisional. 
Table 2 
MEXICO: PRODUCTION BY SECTORS 
(Percentage variations) a 
Manufactures Con- Elec-
Total Mining Petro- struc- trici-

















































































































































































Source: ECIAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de 
México. 
a: Variations in average cumulative index with respect to the same 
period of the preceding year. 
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Table 3 
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Source: ECXAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de Mexico 
and the Ministry of Programming and Budget. 
a: With respect to the same period of the preceding year. b: With 
respect to the same month of the preceding year. 
Table 4 
MEXICO: PRICE INDEX 
(Percentage variations) 
Consumer price index Wholesale price index 
1987 1988 1987 1988 
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Source: ECLAC, an the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de 
Mexico. 
a: With respect to the preceding month, b: With respect to December 





































































































pplied by the National 
Minimum Wage Commission and the Banco de Mexico. 
a: With respect to the same month of the preceding year. 
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from the Banco de Mexico. 
a: With respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
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Table 7 
MEXICO: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS 



















































1988 1987 1988 
1044 162 219 
2249 331 488 
3477 540 696 
4659 695 868 

























46 691 779 -10.4 16.1 
103 1346 1658 -9.3 27.6 
165 2136 2616 -11.3 24.3 
217 2914 3574 -12.5 23.6 








on the basis of figures from the Banco de Mexico. 
















MEXICO: STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS 
(Pnrmil^tiM re f igi 























































•• ¡sum— uiouauj J.LCU. 
1988 er goods goods 
goods 
237 23.1 48.8 26.1 
501 49.0 50.8 44.4 
794 54.1 48.9 47.0 
1059 64.4 45.7 48.5 
1366 84.8 48.5 50.3 
ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Banco de Mexico. 
respec ic to the same period of the • nrecedim vear. 
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Table 9 
MEXICO: EXCHANGE RATE 
Official exchange rate 
(Pesos per dollar) 
Free Controlled 
1987 1988 1987 1988 
Adjusted real exchange rate 
































































































Source: ECEAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de Mexico 
and the International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics. 
a: Index of nominal exchange rate deflated by the wholesale price index 
and adjusted by the United States wholesale price index. 
Table 10 
MEXICO: MAIN OPERATIONS OF THE CONSOIIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR 
(Cumulative values in billions of pesos) 
Income Expenditure 
Deficit 










































































































a: With respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
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Table 11 
MEXICO: MONETARY AGGREGATES 
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Ml M2 M3 M4 
72.1 94.4 100.2 104.4 
77.3 95.8 108.3 112.7 
80.7 102.5 120.7 123.5 
81.0 112.4 129.9 131.4 
95.5 108.9 134.0 135.1 
97.8 117.3 140.2 141.6 
99.6 125.8 153.1 153.5 
104.5 128.2 158.9 158.5 
122.9 126.6 164.2 161.3 
122.3 133.5 164.5 161.9 
131.5 134.8 164.3 161.2 
140.9 131.2 157.3 154.5 
129.7 141.0 159.4 158.0 
131.9 131.3 152.9 150.8 
143.0 131.4 156.9 153.7 




145.7 121.6 153.7 150.3 
134.1 109.3 142.5 139.9 
133.1 95.6 124.7 121.9 
figures supplied by the Banco de 
Mexico. 
Note: Ml = Money plus national and foreign currency checking accounts. 
M2 = Ml plus negotiable bank paper with a term of up to one year and 
bank loans. M3 = M2 plus non-negotiable bank paper with a term of up 
to one year (Treasury Certificates, Federal Government Bonds, 
Development Bonds and commercial paper). M4 = M3 plus long-term 
financial instruments (over one year), Petroleum Bonds, etc. 

























































































































The Peruvian economy was characterized up to August by the persistence of dual 
imbalances, in the public sector accounts and in the balance of payments, and by the 
limited scope of the efforts to overcome these problems. This had two clear 
consequences: a rapid rise in inflation and the appearance of recessionary symptoms 
in production, employment and wages. 
In view of the growing lag of the various exchange rates, and especially of those 
applicable to imports, measures were taken in March to check the external sector 
deterioration. Noteworthy among these measures were the restoration of the practice of 
foreign exchange budgeting, the legalization of the parallel market and, in the following 
month, the unification of the exchange rate for exports. At the domestic level, nominal 
interest rates were raised, as were the general sales tax and the fuel consumption tax. 
At the same time, the prices of goods produced by some public enterprises were raised 
and frozen at the new level for 120 days, as was the import exchange rate. In 
compensation, a general wage increase was granted. 
As the adjustments made were not sufficient, measures had to be taken which were 
severer, although still in line with a gradual approach. In June, nominal interest rates 
were adjusted once again, while the number of import exchange rates was reduced to 
four, and in the following month to three. In July, the factor used for adjusting the 
export exchange rate was raised from 85% to 100% of the CPI. At the same time, the 
level of the controlled prices was raised (including fuel prices and the charges for 
water, energy and telecommunications) but even so these prices still lagged behind the 
level of inflation. Wages were raised again in order to preserve their purchasing power. 
At the end of August, the import exchange rates were modified yet again and interest 
rates and the general sales tax were also increased. 
Finally, in early September the gradual approach was replaced by a more radical 
programme. The exchange rate was unified at a level 90% higher than the highest 
previous official rate; the minimum legal wage was raised by 150%, and the controlled 
prices were more than doubled, while the private sector was given a short time in which 
to make changes in other prices before the beginning of a 120-day price and wage 
freeze. 
In these circumstances, inflation continued to accelerate at an extraordinary rate. 
Thus, up to August consumer prices had risen by 240%, while their growth rate in annual 
terms was 355% --by far the highest rate in Peru's history (see table 5). Among the main 
reasons for this spiral of price increases were the considerable adjustments to the 
exchange rate (especially that applicable to intermediate goods), the greater shortage of 
inputs, the high degree of utilization of installed capacity, and the distortion caused by 
controlled prices, the lag in which also led to speculation and cross-border smuggling. At 
the same time, demand pressures were made worse by the growing money issue deriving 
from the need to finance both the public deficit and the losses caused by the differential 
between the import and export exchange rates. 
Real wages consequently deteriorated (see table 6), thus eroding the main element 
responsible for economic growth in the previous two years. In the first four months of 
"he year, the average level of wages and salaries in Lima went down by 9% in real terms 
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compared with the same period of the year before. Even so, however, in April salaries 
continued to be 16% higher and wages 24% higher than in July 1985. 
The Government's intention to keep up levels of production was reflected in an 
increase in imports, especially of intermediate goods (see table 10), but even so some 
difficulties in supply were observed. The rise in international commodity prices helped 
the recovery in exports, despite the drop in sales of petroleum, cotton and coffee (see 
table 9). Thus, between January and May the deficit on the trade in goods was 
US$63 million, which was slightly less than the figure for the same period of 1987 (see 
table 8). In spite of this and of the maintenance of the restrictions on external debt 
servicing, however, the drop in the inflow of fresh capital caused the 
balance-of-payments deficit to increase. This in turn caused a loss of US$230 million up 
to mid-August in the net reserves of the Central Bank. At the same date, the available 
international liquidity had gone down by US$380 million (see table 11). 
Together with the speeding-up of inflation and the worsening of the 
balance-of-payments deficit, there was a decline in the growth rate of the economy. 
Indeed, after slackening in the first quarter of the year the growth rate of the product 
actually became negative in the second quarter (see table 1). Although this tendency was 
generalized, it was most evident in mining (because of the decline in the production of 
petroleum and most metals); in fisheries (because of the diminution in fishery resources), 
and in manufacturing (because of difficulties in the supply of inputs and the declining 
domestic demand). An exception to this trend was the agricultural sector, which 
continued to expand for the third year running in spite of a slight reduction in the area 
cultivated (see tables 2 and 3). 
At the same time, the index of employment in Metropolitan Lima began to go down 
after having risen steadily since mid-1985. This phenomenon, which was largely concealed 
by the increase in informal activities in commerce and services, was most marked in 
manufacturing (see table 4). 
The public sector deficit increased in real terms. At the level of the central 
government, revenue stagnated, as did investments, while current expenditure increased in 
spite of the reduction in interest payments on the debt (see table 13). The deterioration 
in the public finances was so serious that income covered only 85% of current 
expenditure. At the same time, the lag in adjustment of the prices charged and in 
exchange policy led to an increase in the overall deficit of public enterprises. 
Because of the insufficient supply of external credit, most of the public deficit once 
again had to be covered with resources from the Central Bank. The main factor of 
expansion in primary issue, however, was the "other items" account (which includes 
exchange losses), although this was partially offset by the drawing-down of reserves. 
Money issue increased less than prices, and this, together with a restrictive credit policy, 
caused a drop of 36% in real liquidity over the twelve months ending in August. 
Moreover, the deterioration in real yields led to a decline in financial saving, despite the 
higher nominal interest rates. This gave rise to a process of decline in financial 
intermediation which was reflected in a 52% drop in real national currency quasi-money 
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Table 1 
PERU: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 































































































































Statistics and the Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
Adjusted for seasonal variations. Quarterly averages. 
Table 2 
PERU: AGRICUnCURAL PRODUCTION 










































































































































































Central Reserve Bank of 
Peru. 
a: With respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
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Table 3 
PERU: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
Percentage variations 
Index 1979=100 < 
1987 1988 
1986 1987 1988 







































































































Source: BCIAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the National 
Institute of Statistics of Peru. 
a: With respect to the same month of the preceding year. 
b: Variations in average cumulative index with respect to the same 
period of the preceding year. 
Table 4 
PERU: EMPLOYMENT LEVELS IN THE LIMA METROPOLITAN AREA 
(Index 1979=100) a 
Total Manufacturing Commerce Services 
1986 1987 1988 1986 1987 1988 1986 1987 1988 1986 1987 1988 
I 93.9 99.5 101.9 87.4 95.1 98.0 91.7 94.2 97.3 107.1 109.8 111.0 
II 94.8 101.1 101.6 88.7 97.0 97.2 91.6 95.3 97.5 107.7 110.8 111.4 
III 96.3 101.7 90.6 98.0 93.1 95.3 108.7 110.9 
IV 98.8 103.6 93.8 100.7 96.8 98.6 109.1 111.1 
Source; ECIAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the National 
Institute of Statistics of Peru. 
a: Quarterly averages. 
Table 5 
PERU: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Percentage variations) 
1986 1987 1988 













































































































Source: ECIAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the National 





























PETO: REAL REMUNERATIONS 

































































Institute of Statistics. 
a: Wage index, average basis of May and August 1985. b: Of legal 
minimum wage, c: With respect to the preceding month, d: Percentage 
variation in average cumulative index with respect to the same period 

























































































































by the Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru and the International Monetary Fund. 
a: Index of the nominal exchange rate deflated by the consumer price 
index and adjusted by the United States wholesale price index, b: 
Mercado Único de Cambios (Single Exchange Rate Market) index on which 
quotations for the rest of the exchange rates for imports and exports 
are based. 
c: Foreign-currency bank certificates (FCBC). The free market exchange 
rate for financial transactions has been considered, up to July 1987. 
*: From August 1 to August 22. 
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Table 8 









































































































































Bark of Peru. 
a! With respect to the sane period of the preceding year. 
*( Total January-May. 
Table 9 
PERU: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS, FOB 
(Millions of dollars) 
1987 
II III IV 













417 506 517 449 













476 361 0.2 14.1 10.1 12.4 
330 237 11.4 32.5 26.1 29.6 
45 27 18.1 -34.8 -55.0 -44.4 
18 11 -53.3 -43.8 -70.3 -57.2 
84 86 7.5 25.4 100.0 53.7 
Kan-traditional 165 174 198 190 175 129 11.0 6.1 12.3 8.5 
Souroe: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru. 
a: With respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
*: April-May. **: January-May. 
Table 10 
PERU: IMPORTS STRUCTURE, FOB 
(Millions of dollars) 
1987 
II III IV 











120 89 91 99 
323 294 378 413 
237 280 250 243 
94 44 7.1 -21.7 -33.3 -25.5 
413 257 16.7 27.9 41.2 32.6 
25Í 144 21.3 5.9 -19.1 -4.9 
' ii 
0 1 34.9 — — — 
Souroe: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of 
Peru. 
a: With respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
*: April-May. **: January-May. 
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Table 11 
FERJ: CORRAL BANK NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 




















































Bd by the Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru. 
a: Deposits in foreign exchange, plus holdings in gold and silver, and 
other not assets. 
*: As of August 19. 
Table 12 
m » : M3ŒTARÏ AGGREGATES 






II III IV II II 
Monetary base 
Liquidity 





39.8 48.6 61.9 78.7 94.3 117.6 111.0 136.9 142.0 
78.9 94.1 114.5 149.2 180.3 219.1 112.8 128.5 132.8 
70.9 86.2 107.7 134.3 164.2 200.9 116.4 131.6 133.1 
33.0 39.8 54.3 75.5 93.6 118.1 143.5 183.6 196.7 
37.9 46.4 53.4 58.8 70.6 82.8 89.1 86.3 78.4 
8 .0 7.9 6.8 14.9 16.1 18.2 86.3 101.3 130.4 
Source: ECIAC, on the basis of the figures supplied by the Central 
Reserve Bank of Peru. 
a: Figures at end of period. b: With respect to the sama period of 
the preceding year. c: Intis equivalent. 
Table 13 
PERU: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCCME AND EXPENDITURE 




Savings on current account 
Capital expenditure 






credits (Central Reserve Bank) 
Credits (others - banking 
system) 
Bonds 















































a: Percentage variation. 
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URUGUAY 
The Uruguayan economy continued to grow during the first half of 1988 (although more 
slowly than in 1987) and reduced its current account deficit somewhat thanks to a 
significant increase in exports. The gradual decline in the rate of inflation levelled off 
towards the middle of the year at about 60%, while the public sector deficit increased 
slightly after two years of intensive fiscal adjustment. 
After having grown at the rate of 6% in the first half of 1987, the gross domestic 
product increased by only about 2% between that period and the first half of 1988, thus 
marking the continuation of the slackening of growth observed as from the second 
quarter of 1987. This evolution was largely due to the very sharp fall in the growth rate 
of manufacturing (see table 1). The unemployment rate, for its part, after having risen in 
the first quarter, went down steadily thereafter and in July reached its lowest level in 
the last six years (see table 2). 
The rate of inflation, which had begun to slacken in 1986, continued to go down up 
to the end of the first quarter of 1988, when the annual variation in the consumer price 
index was the lowest since May 1984, but in April it began to rise again (see table 3). 
This upward trend was mainly due to the evolution of the exchange rate, wages and 
agricultural prices. Whereas the first two variables helped to keep the annual rate of 
price increases within the vicinity of 60%, the variations in agricultural prices led to 
oscillations around that general level. Thus, in wholesale transactions, the rate of 
increase of agricultural prices rose to 57% in July after having stood at only 30% in the 
twelve months ending in March. 
Nominal remunerations rose at a rate of around 60% per year, in a context of 
passive indexation of private sector work contracts and slower corrections in the public 
sector. In real terms, remunerations rose by less than 4%, and even then at a decreasing 
monthly rate (see table 4). At the end of the first half of the year, the authorities 
proposed a new mechanism for private sector wage agreements under which the 
four-monthly adjustments would be made on the basis of 90% of the variation in prices in 
the preceding period. 
Adjustment of the price of the U.S. dollar was carried out under a policy aimed at 
keeping the real exchange rate at a competitive level. Thus, after having deteriorated up 
to September 1987, the exchange rate increased by a total of 14% in the following nine 
months, so that in June it was 6% higher than the rate prevailing in the middle of the 
previous year (see table 5). The slackening in the growth rate of real wages was thus 
accompanied by rises in the real exchange rate. 
The terms of trade improved substantially as a result of the drop in oil prices and 
the increase in the unit value of exports. This was particularly the case of wool and 
rice, but the prices of industrial exports also rose. The drop in beef prices was an 
exception to this situation, although income from beef exports was kept up thanks to an 
increase in the volume exported. 
As a result of these developments, the value of exports of goods in the first half of 
the year was 23% higher than in the corresponding period of the year before, whereas 
the value of imports increased by only 3%. There was thus a turnaround in the trade 
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balance situation, which went from a deficit of US$4 million in January-June 1987 to a 
surplus of almost US$120 million (see table 6). This made up for the poor results of the 
tourist season (first quarter of the year), which brought in only a small amount of 
foreign exchange because of the smaller flow of visitors from Argentina. 
Exports grew as a result of increases in sales of both traditional products (31%) and 
non-traditional products (18%). With regard to imports, petroleum purchases increased by 
7% and those of capital goods by 4%, but the value of imports of raw materials and 
consumer goods went down (see tables 7 and 8). The importance of markets outside the 
region for Uruguayan exports continued to increase. The weight of Argentina and Brazil 
in total exports went down from 25% to 20%, while the weight of these two countries in 
total imports rose from 38% to 43%. 
It would appear that the current account position continued to be negative. 
Nevertheless, the inflow of capital was sufficiently great to permit the international 
reserves of the Central Bank to grow by some US$60 million in the first half of the year 
(see table 9), thus exceeding the initial projections, which had forecast no variation of 
reserves in 1988 as a whole, with an actual loss of reserves in the first half of the year. 
The monetary aggregates expanded by about 60% during the first half of the year, with 
money and quasi-money showing faster growth rates than this at the end of that period 
(see table 10). The interest rate on deposits in local currency remained positive in real 
terms, while interest rates on loans registered positive real values of over 15% per year. 
Foreign currency deposits increased by almost US$400 million (20%) over the December 
1987 figure, thus totalling nearly US$2.5 billion, equivalent to one-third of the gross 
domestic product. 
Fiscal expenditure grew by 10% in real terms, exceeding the expansion in income 
and thus increasing the fiscal deficit. However, the form of financing of the deficit used 
by the central administration did not bring additional pressures to bear on the money 
issue. Thus, although the fiscal imbalance increased, only a small part of this deficit was 
financed with credit from the Central Bank, 80% of the resources being obtained by the 
sale of public debt securities denominated in foreign currency. 
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Figure 1 
URUGUAY: QUARTERLY EVOLUTION OF THE MAIN 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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URUGUAY: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 











Source: Central Bank. 





































































figures, c: Includes storage. 
Table 2 




















































































Source: Department of Statistics and Censuses. 
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Table 3 













































































































































































































































































a: Index of nominal wages and salaries deflated by the Consumer Price Index. 
b: Variations in average cumulative index as compared to the same period 
the preceding year, c: With respect to the same month of the preceding year. 
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Table 5 














Official exchange rate medio 




































































































ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. International Financial 
Statistics. 
a: Index of the nominal exchange rate deflated by the wholesale price 
index and adjusted by the United States wholesale price index. 
Table 6 































































































































































































































a: With respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
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Table 7 
URUGUAY: STRUCTURE OF EXPORES 
































Year Month Year Month 
26.3 28.5 28.5 
60.7 48.5 77.0 
100.1 43.6 120.6 
133.1 52.0 172.6 
172.2 58.4 231.0 












































































Note: T = Traditional exports. NT = Non-traditional exports. 
a: Of cumulative figures with respect to the same period of the 
preceding year. 
Table 8 
URUGUAY: STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS 
Millions of dollars a Percentage variations b 














































Source: Central Bank. 




URUGUAY: NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 








Total a Central Bank 
1987 c 1988 d 
1 168 1 362 
1 139 1 340 * 
1 149 
1 154 
1 338 d 
Central Bank. 
1987 c 1988 d 
845 1 031 
828 1 079 
867 
865 
1 018 d 
Variation in total reserves 
Quarter 











a: Includes reserves of the Central Bank of Uruguay and of the Banco de 
la Republica Oriental del Uruguay, b: With respect to December of the 
preceding year, c: Gold valued at US$ 313.00. d: Gold valued at 
US$ 371.78 troy ounce. *: May. 
Table 10 
URUGUAY: MONETARY AGGREGATES 
Ml DP M2 DE M3 













































Note: Ml = Money (supply currency outside banks plus deposits on current 
account. DP = Time deposits in local currency. M2 = ML + DP. DE •* 
Deposits in foreign currency. M3 = M2 + DE. 
a: Balance at the end of period, b: With respect to the same month in 
the preceding year. 
Table 11 
URUGUAY: INDICADORES FISCALES 
Billions of New Uruguayan pesos a 
1987 
I E 
Mar 54.9 57.8 
Jun 114.3 123.4 
Sep 183.5 197.8 








I E B 
88.3 101.3 -12.9 
189.5 216.8 -27.3 
of Statistics and Censuses. 
Pe] rcentage variation b 
1988/1987 
I E B 
60.8 75.3 
65.8 75.7 
Note: I = Income; E = Expenditure; B = Balance. 




The economic policy followed in the first half of 1988 maintained the expansionary 
approach which has characterized it since the end of 1985. Consequently, domestic 
activity has continued to grow in spite of the deterioration in the external accounts, 
thanks to its drawing down of reserves. After having reached the unprecedented figure of 
40% in 1987, the rate of inflation went down markedly in the first quarter of 1988, but 
speeded up again in June and July. The external accounts were affected by the 
weakening in the international price of petroleum and the scanty results of efforts to 
obtain additional external financing. As a result, the international reserves of the Central 
Bank went down by almost US$1 billion in the first half of the year, generating strong 
upward pressure on the free exchange rate in mid-year. 
Although the expansion in the current expenditure of the government was moderated 
by the freezing of the wages of public employees, total expenditure still maintained its 
upward trend because of the persistent increase in the investment expenditure of public 
enterprises, especially those in the mining sector. There were substantial increases in the 
production of gold, bauxite, coal and iron ore, as well as in basic industries (steel, 
aluminium and petrochemicals) (see table 2). Progress was more erratic in the private 
sector, but the volume of domestic sales nevertheless recovered from the low levels 
registered at the beginning of the previous year, due both to the replacement of stocks 
and to advance purchases prompted by the growing expectations of devaluation. As a 
result of these changes, open unemployment went down to 7.7% in the fist half of the 
year: the lowest rate since 1982. 
During the early months of the year, the recovery in economic activity was 
accompanied by a marked decline in inflation. Thus, consumer prices went down in 
February and March, mainly because of the seasonal drop in the prices of some 
agricultural products, the application of stricter controls over the prices of basic goods, 
and also the freezing of public sector prices and wages. Subsequently, however, inflation 
accelerated so much that both in June and July consumer prices rose by 5%. The main 
cause of this change of trend was the renewed rise in the prices of foodstuffs, which 
increased by almost 40% in June alone. Even so, however, the rise in the consumer price 
index between July 1987 and July 1988 was only 26% --much less than the figure 
registered at the end of the previous year (see table 3). 
Monetary policy did not undergo any significant changes. Indeed, nominal interest 
rates remained at the same level fixed in October 1985. Thus, in spite of the decline in 
the rate of inflation in the first quarter, real interest rates continued to be strongly 
negative. At the same time, the monetary authorities stepped up their efforts to absorb 
excess bank liquidity through the "money bureau" of the Central Bank, which offers 
interest rates on short-term interbank deposits much higher than the maximum rates 
authorized for loans by commercial banks to the public. Consequently, the annual growth 
rate of the monetary aggregates, which had risen rapidly in 1987, tended to settle down 
at around 20% (see table 7). 
After partially recovering in the first half of 1987, the price of petroleum once 
again deteriorated as from August of that year, due to the generalized over-supply of 
crude. The negative effects of this change in the international situation were aggravated 
by technical problems in the country's main refinery, so that petroleum products --which 
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are sold at higher relative prices— accounted for a smaller share of total external sales 
of hydrocarbons. Thus, the average price of petroleum exports fell below US$14 per 
barrel during the first quarter, representing a decline of 15% with respect to the average 
for the previous year. Although the price of crude recovered slightly in the following 
two months as a result of the rise in world demand, the average sale price was almost 
10% lower than that registered in 1987 (see table 1). 
In order to check the effect of this decline on foreign exchange income, an effort 
was made to increase sales of products not covered by the OPEP quota system, especially 
condensates (extra-light petroleum obtained from natural gas) and extra-heavy products. 
Thanks to this, export volumes expanded by 5% in the first quarter, but even so 
petroleum income went down by over 12% compared with the same period in the previous 
year (see tables 1 and 4). 
The drop in petroleum income was partially offset by the increased value of exports 
of aluminium (the price of which rose by 37% in the first seven months of the year) and 
by the increase of more than 100% in sales of non-monetary gold. This was not enough, 
however, to compensate for the increase in the cost of servicing the external debt 
caused by the rise in international interest rates and the higher amortization payments, 
which it is estimated will increase from US$1.9 billion in 1987 to US$2.2 billion in 1988. 
In these circumstances, the authorities decided —after having eased restrictions on the 
supply of foreign exchange at the preferential rate in the first quarter of the year— to 
re-impose controls in this respect. At the same time, they intensified their efforts to 
obtain additional external financing and managed to reach agreements with multilateral, 
bilateral and private creditors for the financing of industrial and mining projects, 
although the actual disbursements registered during the first half of the year were rather 
modest. In addition, bonds worth a total of US$200 million were sold on international 
markets. Nevertheless, the total amount of external financing mobilized was far below the 
outlays on external debt servicing, so that the decline in the international reserves, 
which had been checked in 1987, began again in the early months of 1988. Indeed, the 
international reserves of the Central Bank went down by US$970 million in the first half 
of the year, despite the transfer of US$800 million to the issuing institute by the 
Venezuelan Investment Fund. All in all, the total loss of reserves in this period of time 
came to nearly US$1.8 billion. 
The deterioration in the external accounts and the greater restrictions on the 
supply of foreign exchange at the preferential exchange rate generated strong upward 
pressures on the price of the dollar on the free market, which, after having remained 
relatively stable during the first five months of the year, went up by over 20% in June 
and July and by the beginning of August reached a level more than 30% above that 
registered in 1987 (see table 6). 
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Table 1 





























































¡Source: ECIAC, on the basis of figures supplied by Petróleos de Venezuela and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
a: Thousands of barrels per day. bi Dollars per barrel. Average price for total 
exports (crude oil and petroleum products). c: Millions of dollars. Monthly 
average, d: January-June average, ei January-March average. f: January-May 
average. g: April-May average. 
Table 2 
VENEZUELA: ÜÍDICATORS OF ECONOMIC ACnVTTÏ 
(Monthly averages) 
Steel Petrochemicals* Cement Automobile 






















































208 9 661 10 311 
the basis of figures from the Ministry of Energy and Mines, 
the Latin American Institute of Iron Ore and Steel, and Veneconomia, 
S.A. 
a: Thousands of tons. b: Thousands of 60 kilogrammes bags, c: Units. 
d: January-May average, e: January-March average. f: April-May average. 
Table 3 

































































































































































































































on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
a: Includes receipts from the Venezuelan Investment Fund, b: Imports of goods 
and services. Including expenditure in foreign exchange of Petróleos de 
Venezuela and agreements. Excluding free market exchange rate imports. 
c: Includes Central Bank sales of' foreign exchange on the free market. 
Table 5 
VENEZUELA: NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
(Millions of dollars) 























• • • 
• • • 
Source: ECXAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of 
Venezuela and the International Monetary Fund. 
Table 6 
VENEZUELA: FREE EXCHANGE RATE 
(Bolívares per dollar) 



















































































on the basis of data supplied by the central Bank of 
Venezuela and the International Monetary Fund. 
Up to August 10, 1988. 
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Table 7 








































































































































!, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
Table 8 
VENEZUELA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
(Billions of bolívares) 
Income Expenditure Balance Financing 
Domestic Variation 




































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela 
and the International Monetary Fund. 
a: (-) means increase. b: Balance at end of period. 
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